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The dependency of complex embedded Safety-Critical Systems across Avionics and Aerospace domains on their underlying
software and hardware components has gradually increased with progression in time. Such application domain systems are
developed based on a complex integrated architecture, which is modular in nature. Engineering practices assured with system
safety standards to manage the failure, faulty, and unsafe operational conditions are very much necessary. System safety analyses
involve the analysis of complex software architecture of the system, a major aspect in leading to fatal consequences in the behaviour
of Safety-Critical Systems, and provide high reliability and dependability factors during their development. In this paper, we propose
an architecture fault modeling and the safety analyses approach that will aid in identifying and eliminating the design flaws. The
formal foundations of SAE Architecture Analysis & Design Language (AADL) augmented with the Error Model Annex (EMV)
are discussed. The fault propagation, failure behaviour, and the composite behaviour of the design flaws/failures are considered
for architecture safety analysis. The illustration of the proposed approach is validated by implementing the Speed Control Unit of
Power-Boat Autopilot (PBA) system. The Error Model Annex (EMV) is guided with the pattern of consideration and inclusion
of probable failure scenarios and propagation of fault conditions in the Speed Control Unit of Power-Boat Autopilot (PBA). This
helps in validating the system architecture with the detection of the error event in the model and its impact in the operational
environment. This also provides an insight of the certification impact that these exceptional conditions pose at various criticality
levels and design assurance levels and its implications in verifying and validating the designs.
1. Introduction
Systematic analyses of the architectural models modeled
using the Model-Based Engineering (MBE) [1] practices,
early and at every abstraction level, imbibe a greater con-
fidence in the integration of the system. The creation and
analysis of architectural models of a system support predic-
tion and understanding of the system’s capabilities and its
operational quality attributes.These attributes include perfor-
mance, reliability, reusability, safety, and security. All along
the developmental lifecycle, the faults such as their failure
modes and their propagation effects, at system-level, can be
predicted. Such issues remain unnoticed until system integra-
tion and testing.This proves to be a costly rework resulting in
an unaccounted project time, cost, and maintenance.
For safety-critical advanced complex embedded systems,
the system design and development are in compliance
with the safety standards and engineered with practices
as specified by MIL-STD882 [2], SAE ARP-4761 [3], and
DO-178B/C [4]. The process of development, management,
and controlling these systems in conformance with the
safety practices proves to have an impact on the system
requirements, postsystem integration, and test. With the
evolution of the system, availability and reliability of these
models are to be consistent and this poses a great challenge.
These safety practices include various availability and reli-
ability prognosiswith the help of system architecturalmodels.
Model-Based Engineering approaches for safety analyses
address these issues and prove to provide consolidated infor-
mation about the informal requirements and the architecture
model of the system. The safety analyses performed on a
system also take into consideration the physical environ-
ment of its deployment and functioning. Due to insufficient
support of the formal languages trend is to make use of
architecture description languages such asArchitectureAnal-
ysis & Design Language (AADL) and Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE) standard. AADL, a high-level architectural
descriptive language, basically provides a platform for overall
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integration of various system recommended components
via formal semantics and syntax. This component-based
modeling language is extended with the introduction of
sublanguages as Annexes. AADL is packaged with multiple
Annex sublanguages such as Error Model Annex (EAnnex)
and Behaviour Annex (BAnnex) as standards. The EAnnex
standard is suitably augmented with safety semantics and
ontology of fault propagation, supporting error annotations
on the architectural models [5].This thus enables the compo-
nent error models and their interactions to be considered in
context to the system architecture modeled using AADL.
This paper presents our contributions as a case study
implementation (Speed Control Unit of Power-Boat Autopi-
lot) to the standard approach for the illustration of its applica-
tion.The paper is organized as follows. Firstly, we summarize
the concept of Architecture Analysis & Design Language
(SAE AADL) and Error Model Annex (EAnnex/EMV2).
Next we provide an illustration of the architecture fault
model specification for Speed Control Unit of a Power-Boat
Autopilot (PBA). We also discuss the various safety analyses
methods involved in MIL-STD882 safety practice. Finally,
we conclude the paper with the assessment of these safety
analyses based on the architecture fault models.
2. Error Model Annex in Architecture Analysis
& Design Language (AADL)
Architecture Analysis & Design Language (AADL), an SAE
International standard, is a unified framework providing
extensive formal foundations for Model-Based Engineering
(MBE) practices. These practices extend throughout the
system design, integration, and assurance with safety stan-
dards. AADL distinctly represents a system hardware and
software components and their interactions via interfaces.
Critical real-time computational factors such as performance,
dependability, safety, security, and data integrity can be
rigorously analysed with AADL.
AADL also integrates custom analyses and specification
techniques during the engineering process.This allows in the
development and analysis of a single, unified system archi-
tectural model. AADL can be extended using the specialized
language constructs that can be attached to the components
of the architectural model defined by AADL. These com-
ponents are reinforced with additional characteristics and
requirements, referred to as Annex languages. The architec-
tural model components are annotated with these properties
andAnnex language clauses for functional andnonfunctional
analyses. Error Model Annex (EMV), which is an extension
of AADL, aids in describing the failure conditions and fault
propagations as error events, propagations, occurrence, and
their distribution properties. With the integration of these
constructs in the AADLmodel/s, as shown in Figure 1 [6], the
existing components are extended as current models liable
for Safety Evaluation and Analyses.This can be done with the
help of the algorithms inOSATE or by using other third party
tools.
(i) Error Annex. The Error Model Annex (EAnnex) is a
sublanguage of AADL. This sublanguage extension includes
Reliability
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Figure 1: AADL ecosystem.
the analyses of the runtime architectures. The EAnnex [7, 8]
annotates the hardware and the software component archi-
tectures with error states, error events, error transitions, and
error propagations that may affect the component interacting
with each other. In Error Model Annex subclause conditions
can be specified under which the errors are propagated
through designated component ports. Error Model Annex
basically helps in defining the fault models, hazards, fault
propagation, failure modes, and effects, as well as speci-
fying compositional fault behaviour. AADL Error Model
Annex supports architectural fault modeling at three levels
of abstraction [9].
(1) Modeling of faults in systems and their implications
on other dependent components of the physical envi-
ronment of its operation through propagation of these
faults (including Hazard identification, fault impact
analysis)
(2) Modeling of faults occurring in a component of the
system and analysing the behaviour of the same
across various modes termed as failure modes and
their effects on other components and their related
propagations and being also inclusive of the recovery
strategies involved
(3) Compositional abstraction of system error behaviour
in terms of its subsystems
Error Model Annex (EMV2) overlays major focus on the
standards set of error types and error propagation, defined
by AADL as a standard syntactic construct through the
introduction of Annex libraries. These Annex libraries pro-
vide an overlook of the formally specified error propagation
behaviours [10, 11]. Some of the common error types are as
follows [9].
(1) Commission and Omission Errors. They represent loss of
message/command and failure to provide readings from a
component.
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Figure 2: PBA Speed Control Unit without error specification.
(2) Timing Errors.They represent arrival rate, service too early
or late, and unsynchronized rate.
(3) Value Errors. They represent individual service item error
or errors in a sequence of values.
(4) Replication Errors. They represent replicates of states or
services being communicated.
(5) Concurrency Errors. They represent accessing shared
logical or physical resources.
Along with these the error model types can be referenced
in the Error Model Annex subclause. The constructs for the
EMV2 are similar to the syntax and style as defined forAADL.
An exception is that any set of textual language constructs can
be included within an Annex that includes Object Constraint
Language (OCL) [12] or a temporal logic notation [13].
3. Implementation of Proposed Research
In this section we exhibit the architecture fault modeling in
AADL, along with the extension of EMV2, at three levels of
abstraction with a suitable case study, Speed Control Unit of
Power-Boat Autopilot (PBA). This unit is a simplified speed
control model, including a pilot interface unit for input of
relevant Power-Boat Autopilot information, a speed sensor
that sends speed data to the PBA, the PBA controller, a
throttle actuator that responds to the commands specified by
the PBA controller, and a display unit. The type definitions
defining the component, component names, their runtime
category, and interfaces are identified and defined.The speed
sensor, pilot interface, throttle actuator, and the display unit
are modeled as devices, while the PBA control functions are
represented as process, as shown in Figure 2. With all these
we perform the safety analyses with the specification of the
source of error and its propagation across the system and its
components. This is carried out by defining the error states
and their corresponding compositional fault behaviour. This
is followed by the expansion of the fault logic with respect to
its error behaviour related to each component of the system
and its response to the failures.
(ii) Specification of Error Source and Propagation. The source
of errors and their propagation with respect to each com-
ponent of a system in PBA Speed Control Unit is defined,
as shown in Box 1. In the case study on flow src related
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device interface
features
set speed : out data port;
disengage : out event port;
control on : out event port;
BA1 : requires bus access Marine.Standard;
flows
on flow src : flow source set speed;
annex EMV2{∗∗
use types ErrorModelLibrary;
use behavior ErrorModelLibrary::Simple;
error propagations
set speed: out propagation{NoValue};
disengage: out propagation{NoService};
control on: out propagation{NoService};
flows
fPath Src: error source set speed{NoValue};
end propagations;
Box 1: Error source and propagation.
to the device, pilot interface unit is sourcing the fault. The
component error propagations are also defined with the error
NoValue & NoService.
The component error behaviour is also defined for the
system components that correlate to the faults that are
possible to occur. Here in this system the NoValue due to
failure passes on from the pilot interface unit to the throttle
actuator. The same is being conveyed to the display unit
feature status. In addition to this fault, there occurs another
propagation of error that is NoService. This fault results
in the Failed state of the system. Here we can observe that
the specification is automatically inherited by the instances
of each component and their interactive neighbors. The
error propagation paths inherent in such system architecture
AADL models form a basis, as a need for the representation
of Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Common
Cause Analysis (CCA).
(iii) Composite Error Behaviour. The Error Model Annex
library is associated with the state machine defined for
the system component model using the declaration
use behaviour, as shown in Box 2. This maps the
error state behaviour of the subcomponents (both hardware
and software components) onto the error states of the system
itself. In this case study of Speed Control Unit of PBA, we
have two error states defined for each component, that is,
Failure and Failed. But here we have considered only
the Failed state as the subcomponent error state and the
state Operational as the recovery state. We can see in this
example that the system error behaviour is mapped from the
subcomponent behaviours defined as
system implementation
Complete.PBA speed control ab
subcomponents
speed sensor : device sensor.speed;
throttle : device actuator.speed;
interface unit : device interface.pilot;
speed control : process control ex.speed;
display unit inter : device display unit;
RT 2GHz : processor Real Time.two GHz;
Standard Marine Bus : bus Marine.Standard;
Stand Memory : memory RAM.Standard;
annex EMV2{∗∗
use types ErrorModelLibrary;
use behavior ErrorModelLibrary::Simple;
composite error behavior
states
[throttle.Failed and
display unit inter.Failed]-> Failed;
[display unit inter.Failed]-> Operational;
end composite;
Box 2: Composite error behaviour.
[throttle.Failed and display unit inter
.Failed] -> Failed.
We assume that the system fails if either of the devices,
that is, throttle actuator or the display unit, behaves in the
Failed state, while it tends to recover from the Failed state
and remains to be Operational even if the display unit
fails, as the speed control unit mainly depends on the throttle
command in maintaining and controlling the speed of the
PBA.
[display unit inter.Failed] -> Operational.
This provides a scope for redundancy management for
fault management capability of the system as well as seek
for extensive solutions for reliability and availability analyses
through various hierarchical levels of the system architecture.
This methodology is not advisable for Markov Chains as
the systems tends to grow quickly with their dependencies
among various components within a system, as the number
of components increases.
(iv) Component Error Behaviour. The modeler will have the
flexibility of analysing the possible error behaviour that may
correspond to individual components of a system. This also
provides an insight into the component internal failures
and the divergent factors that may result in failure mode,
in turn having an impact on other components. The case
study in this paper specifies that there might be multiple
failure modes like Failure and Failed. In Failed mode
the entire component is assumed to be redundant while in
the Failure the component is working but having erroneous
outputs/output states, as shown in Box 3.
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device display unit
features
status : in data port;
BA1 : requires bus access Marine.Standard;
flows
on flow snk : flow sink status;
annex EMV2{∗∗
use types ErrorModelLibrary;
use behavior ErrorModelLibrary::Simple;
error propagations
status: in propagation{NoValue};
Flows
fPath Snk: error sink status{NoValue};
end propagations;
component error behavior
transitions
t0: Operational -[status{NoValue}] -> Failed;
end component;
Box 3: Component error behaviour.
The failure modes are represented using the error states
with more likely coupled error behaviour of the subsys-
tem/component.The consistency checker associated with the
Error Model Annex abstracts the propagation specification
to introduce unique and distinctive error types. While the
modeling tool associated with the Error Model Annex val-
idates the organization of the component error behaviour
along with the propagation specification specific to each of
the components in the system architecture, the actual system
architecturemust include the Safety System component/s that
regulates the fault management and aids in safety analyses.
4. Safety Analyses
Safety Analyses involve various analytical processes such as
consistency checks, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), FailureModes
and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Functional Hazard Assessment
(FHA), and CommonMode Assessment (CMA) of the archi-
tectural model. The architecture model and its associated
fault model are designed and developed in Open Source
AADLTool Environment (OSATE) [14]. It is an Eclipse based
AADL modeling framework. There is also need to the safety
analysis tool such as OpenFTA [15]. An Open Source tool
for FTA is integrated into Eclipse environment, to assist in
generation of FTA and its relevant documents, while CMA,
FMEA, and FHA reports are generated as a built-in feature
from OSATE.
(i) Consistency Checks. The consistency checks at the system
integration level scan for the consistency in their functional-
ity and the interfaces between various models/components,
as shown in “Consistency Report” Section. This thereby
strengthens the Virtual integration and analysis of the archi-
tecture model of the system. The consistency of various
models deals with their integration feasibility while the con-
sistency of the internal components in a model concentrates
on the propagation capabilities, redundancies, and so on.
With Error Model Annex the concept of consistency across
the error models as specified checks for the consistency with
respect to the component error behaviour along with the
composite error behaviour of the system. It helps in defining
the correctness of the error state as per the components
specified in the architectural model.This may be proven with
the substantial inclusion of Behaviour Annexes (BAnnex)
[16] along with the Error Model Annex. The consistency
report generated by the OSATE plugin for the case study is
as follows.
Consistency Report
Warning!Complete PBA speed control ab Instance:
C13: component Complete PBA speed control ab
Instance does not define occurrence for and state
Failed
Complete PBA speed control ab Instance:C13: com-
ponentComplete PBA speed control ab Instance has
consistent probability values for state Operational
Warning!Complete PBA speed control ab Instance:
C13: component Complete PBA speed control ab
Instance does not define occurrence for and state
Failed
Warning!Complete PBA speed control ab Instance:
C13: component Complete PBA speed control ab
Instance does not define occurrence for and state
Failed
Warning!Complete PBA speed control ab Instance:
C13: component Complete PBA speed control ab
Instance does not define occurrence for and state
Failed
Complete PBA speed control ab Instance: C13: com-
ponentComplete PBA speed control ab Instance has
consistent probability values for state Failed
(ii) Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). It is a widely used safety
and reliability analysis [17] feature in aerospace, medical
electronics, and industrial automation industries [18]. In this
analysis the major focus is on the top-level event (Minimal
Cut-Set), from a set of combinations of basic events (Faults).
It provides a hierarchical representation of the errors of
the system (top-level event) from the basic events, related
to components as specified in component error behaviour,
in the form of a tree. OSATE depicts this composite error
behaviour of the system from the underlying component
error behaviours as a fault tree that represents specific error
state of the system. This is achieved in the form of two files
fromOSATE for the representation of the fault tree, one being
the database of primary events (.ped), as shown in Figure 4,
causing the top-level error event, and the Fault Tree Analysis
file (.fta). These files are viewed using OpenFTA, as shown in
Figure 3.
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Figure 3: FTA view for PBA Speed Control Unit in OpenFTA.
Figure 4: PED view in OpenFTA.
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Figure 5: FTA validation report.
Figure 6: Minimal cut set analysis report from OpenFTA.
The FTA analysis is in conformance with MIL-STD882
standard and the generated fault tree is validated, as shown
in Figure 5.
The artifacts related to FTA as specified by MIL-STD882
deal with error composites and error events. FTA is a top-
down approach of analysis. TheMinimal Cut Set is evaluated
in the OpenFTA tool and is as shown in Figure 6.
(iii) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Func-
tional Hazard Assessment (FHA). Analysis of the failure
modes associated with the system and the determination of
its effects over the hierarchical evolution, performed system-
atically with a bottom-up approach, is FMEA. With respect
to the errors of the system, FMEA provides the information
about the deficient component/models and their related
effects. It also provides sufficient overview of the failing
component such as its phase of failure, severity/impact, and
so on. FMEA is based on the artifacts that include error
propagation paths (error source, error path, and the error
sink). FHA provides the possible list of error upon the
synthesis of the architectural model of the system.The major
artifacts from FHA comprise the source of the error and the
error events, as shown in Table 1. The details of FHA are
processed from theOSATE tool after themodel is instantiated
and the relevant error information is suitably extracted from
these architecture models. The report will be in the form of
an excel spreadsheet with the specification of the error event
details.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a novel approach of safety
analyses of Safety-Critical Systems using AADL and the
related Error Model Annexes. In spite of the comprehensive
activities involved in safety analyses, the needs for such
approaches are proved to be very much necessary. This is
achieved and projected with the implementation of a suitable
case study, Speed Control Unit of Power-Boat Autopilot.
The employment of analysis techniques such as Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA), Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA), and
consistency of the model along with the conduction of
qualitative and quantitative reliability analyses as part of
these techniques can assess the system hazards and faults.
The assessment covers the generation of suitable reports
justifying the analyses. These methodologies or techniques
provide grant for early identification and probability of
the occurrence of potential problems. This also provides a
perspective to explore additional architectural properties.
Reuse and analysis of the evolved models, provided with
suitable extensions with limited effort, can be achieved with
this approach.The overall effect induces a greater confidence
over abstracted stages of development and safety analyses of
these architectural models of the system. Also analysing the
system based on the Safety-Critical Requirements, with the
expectation of exceptional conditions, hazards are expedited
in the development of Safety System architecture models
which will have an impact in certifying the same. This also
avoids the unnecessary certification costs by understanding
the change impact or the exceptional causes impacts during
system engineering.
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